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We are happy to share the fifth issue of Development Cooperation Review (DCR), even though a little belated. DCR this month engages with South-South Cooperation (SSC) and its accompanying issues linked to global architecture of development cooperation. The first of the special articles begins with understanding the relationship between SSC and Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which has been emerging as a serious challenge to the practitioners and commentators on development cooperation. The article looks at the interlinkage among SSC, SDGs and Development Finance and considers the challenges from the perspective of social reality of Latin America. SSC is also intimately linked to enhance the capacity of southern nations in their health delivery system. An interesting note on the potential of alternate medicinal system for provision of health care has been proposed in the next article. We also have included a case study on Lines of Credit (LoC) provided by India to Bangladesh, giving a brief account of some efforts made to strengthen railways system in Bangladesh. The final contribution to the special articles section considers Indo-Brazilian Defence Cooperation.

In the next regular section on Lexicon and Syntax of Development Cooperation we raise the debate on developing a standardized monitoring and evaluation format for SSC and creating a common template for reporting the activities under SSC. The arguments conclude in favour of “assessment” as the effective approach that does not consider understanding and/or underpinning “comparative” effectiveness of development cooperation as a necessary condition for SSC.

A recently published and interesting book entitled “EU-China-Africa Trilateral Relations in a Multipolar World: Hic Sunt Dracones” by Anna Katharina Stahl has been reviewed in the book review section. The reviewer notes that this book describes the trilateral relations between the EU, China, and Africa, departing from a European point of view, and shows that the EU has started adapting its foreign policy to the emerging multipolar world order and presents new evidence for emerging EU-China-Africa trilateral relations.

This issue also features the key takeaways from the workshop on “Prospects for Triangular Cooperation in the G20” held on the 12 April 2018, San Martin Palace, Buenos Aires. The event was convened by the Argentine G20 presidency and jointly organized by the general directorate of international
cooperation of the ministry of foreign affairs and worship, and the general directorate of cooperation and international finance of the ministry of social development.

The Ambassador’s Perspective section focuses on India’s SSC efforts in Sri Lanka. India’s development cooperation with Sri Lanka is expansive, in both infrastructure development and capacity building. The author categorises these projects into small development projects and large scale infrastructure projects and throws light on the modalities of India’s development cooperation.

The section, SSS in Statistics, considers the space for South-South trade in the global trade scenario.
The present note emphasises three points, four questions and five proposals about SSC and financing the SDG with special attention in the social situations in Latin America countries.

First one is consideration about SDG and the hidden debate of the inequality and the causes of inequality. The SDG has a high level of formality. For instance, who cannot agree that we should tend to have zero hungry, non-poverty and decent work? The Goals of SDG express good intentions and everyone agrees with them, but the inequality is the hidden debate. It is the inequality among countries rather than in countries that continues to explain most of the world’s inequality. Therefore, changes are necessary on a global scale, in which the increase of international commerce in Latin America or only with more development finance will not be enough to reduce this disparity. For instance, it is necessary to emphasise to address the new regulations in international financial flows. Capital mobility must be balanced through workforce mobility.

It is impossible to reduce the inequality only with trade or with superfluous modifications of income in Latin America. Our politicians discuss all the time about how to reduce poverty, but we know that poverty does not mean inequality. Modifying inequality implies long-term processes and does not merely refer to income but also to gender gaps, property, distribution of land, and concentration of political power and influences.

Secondly, Latin America presents a vast inequality, which conditions all manners of distribution of resources.

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In a world where capital reproduction demands specific roles in the international labour division, our countries have not succeeded in designing institutional frameworks that can mitigate global disparity but which rather make it explicit. And as you know, this is political. Economic decisions are not taken out of the blue, but they do depend on political ideology. Latin America is the 2nd most unequal region in the world, only behind Sub-Saharan Africa. This inequality has some very specific features:

• It principally affects children.
• There are some large territorial disparities: for instance, in Brazil and Argentina, the richest lands are 8 times as rich as the poorest ones, whereas in Italy, France and Spain, that gap is reduced to just twice.
• The concentration of land ownership reaches its height in Latin America.

The chances that disparities will persist in the future are very high unless there are global changes as well as changes in the productive and social heterogeneity of the region.

Thirdly, all things considered, let us then admit that the South-South Cooperation has to promote some debate and questions related to development finance on SDG.

One of them is in relation to classifications of countries for aid receipt. Do they have to receipt development finance according to structural characteristics of the countries or according to their income?

Another thing we could wonder about is regarding the permanent doubts about the capacity of low-income countries to absorb large inflows of external assistance. But should we not think that absorptive capacity depends on the very modalities of aid?

On the other hand, general trend in financing for development is the proliferation of funds specific to a sector or a country. The number and volumes of these thematic funds raise problems: for instance about the real appropriation by the recipient countries of policies designed by the leaders of thematic funds. Or the consistency of these strategies with the policies of the countries in the area and beyond. Are the areas where these funds deployed or countries involved are displayed really priority?

The fourth point has to do with what is new, what it is not and when is finance innovative? There is a certain misconception that the agenda for development portrays new way of financing for development. However, it is not new. If philanthropic sources are sometimes classified as innovative, this is essentially due to their greater volume and diversity; the principle itself is not innovative. More clearly considered innovative are the new levy taxes or parafiscal bases that have been introduced or that have been proposed.

Finally, I would like to make a few proposals for us to continue thinking together about the subject of inequality and the role of SSC in relation with development finance on SDG:

• First, we need to enhance the debate and visibility of the effect of the international crises on inequality. Each international crisis has an impact on growth and increases inequality. This affects the lower sectors worse than the rest of the population. While the richer sectors can reconstitute themselves
after these shocks, the lower sectors always fall back to a weaker starting point.

- Secondly, it is imperative to limit external indebtedness, which curtails the margins of autonomy of countries, and to mobilize internal resources. This was a lesson that came at high social cost in Latin America in the 2000s and now Argentina is again facing endless problem of the external indebtedness. We are the country in the world that has contracted more external debt in the last year and it is not for investment but for current expenses.

- In third place, the financing of integration is crucial. Regional integration is a powerful factor in reducing vulnerability, through the various forms it can take (trade, money, coordination of budgetary policies, promotion of regional infrastructure, etc.). External support is essential to implement the integration measures. So far, it does not appear that external financing has been sufficiently addressed to this end.

- Fourthly, it is crucial to reconsider the logics of rights and SDG from the gaps; for instance, Investment, productivity and innovation gap, income gap, inequality and social security.

- In fifth place, what development model we are considering for the region to reduce inequality? This is a persistent debate in Latin America and Argentina. It seems that by just selling commodities all over the world we have not succeeded in reducing inequality. Should we not try to take part of digital and services revolution to overcome the age-old dilemma between farming and industry? In this framework we have to review the functional distribution of income and the role of social security because these are relevant tools of distribution. From 2003 to 2010, if it possible to reduce inequality in Latin America it was for these important tools, although of course it was not enough. After all, inequality reduction depends on political decisions.

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**DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION FOR ALL: ECLAC PUSHES FOR INCREASED YOUTH PARTICIPATION**

The Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, subregional headquarters for the Caribbean has called on decision makers to create a subregional mechanism to facilitate the participation, engagement and collaboration of youth in development frameworks. This was one of the issues discussed at the Caribbean Forum on Population, Youth and Development to advance the regional youth development agenda and is a crucial step in the process towards more egalitarian societies. Lack of youth development in general, and youth unemployment in particular, have become growing concerns for Caribbean countries, with levels of youth unemployment over the last decade remaining higher than before the 2008 financial crisis. The forum identified practical solutions to support the implementation of youth policies and programmes and the involvement of youth in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and other regional and national development processes.

In the aspirational goals of nations, ensuring the health of the people is one of high priority since an unhealthy population is an economic burden. Ensuring healthy lives and promoting well-being for all at all ages is one of the sustainable development goals (SDGs). Since all individuals, both rich and poor, are concerned with personal health and well-being, it occupies the focus of all countries, whether developed or developing or least developed. The challenges being faced by a country vary from one country to the other. The economically more developed countries such as those in the West have achieved certain basic levels of health status like acceptable rates of maternal, neo-natal and under-5 child mortalities and have been able to contain communicable diseases. Their challenges now are in the areas of Non-communicable Diseases (NCDs) and Mental Illnesses. The developing countries present a kaleidoscopic picture of varied and changing levels of achievements in this area. The spectrum ranges from very poor health indicators in certain countries, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, to some countries that compare well with the best advanced countries. There are countries like Cuba who have been able to provide universal health care at comparatively lower cost than many developed countries. This provides the South great opportunities and possibilities for cooperation among them.

Universal health care has to provide for access to affordable quality health care for all people. This

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*Visiting Fellow, RIS*
would necessitate having adequate health care infrastructure, medicines, medical devices and human resources. Since the fight against diseases is one between human ingenuity and microorganisms there is a constant need to update the arsenal with humans in the form of medicines and drugs and this requires significant investments in research and development (R&D), both knowledge and financial. In both the areas of access to medicines and medical equipment’s as well as R&D, Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) play an important role. The scope for cooperation among the global South consisting of developing and least developed countries, in other words, less industrialized countries, in the two areas of health and IPRs is large.

Some scholars look upon SSC in health as “state-state exchange of technical, financial, and human resources, and policy expertise and support among low and middle-income countries.”¹ The contours of SSC got delineated through the Buenos Aires Plan of Action (BAPA) for Promoting and Implementing Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries in 1978, which was signed by 138 countries and endorsed by the United Nations (UN) General Assembly. The objectives of SSC, according to BAPA, are “mutual benefit and for achieving national and collective self-reliance, which are essential for their social and economic development”.² The 40 years that have elapsed since the BAPA signing have seen momentous changes in the global political and economic landscapes and the perceptions of self-reliance now are different from those of the 1970s. The emergence of a global economy has brought in interdependence and mutually beneficial cooperation as more productive than isolated and secluded development. However, the basic principles of such cooperation, as different from the Washington Consensus based aid programme, as stated in the BAPA, still remain valid. They are “strict observance of national sovereignty, economic independence, equal rights and non-interference in domestic affairs of nations.”³ In the Ministerial Declaration of Group of 77 and China in New York on 25 September 2009, among others, highlighted the following principles of SSC: They are “based on a strong, genuine, broad-based partnership and solidarity”, “based on complete equality, mutual respect and mutual benefit”, and “respects national sovereignty in the context of shared responsibility.”⁴

Respecting and adhering to these principles in any SSC partnerships in health and IPR is what will distinguish them from the earlier models of cooperation or aid.

SSC in the health sector in the past has been broadly on the above lines. Many a time these cooperative endeavors involve more than two parties leading to emergence of South-South health networks (Chaturvedi and Mulakala, 2016) where the countries contribute on the basis of their strengths. The collaborations are in different areas like manufacturing, R&D, trade and so on. Setting up of hospitals and joint research centers have been components of SSC in health. India has collaborated with Brazil, China, Bangladesh, etc. on health biotechnology. Private players also played important roles in such collaborations. Provision of human resources, as in the case of Afghanistan, has been a major component of India’s health collaborations. Africa has been a major partner in SSC in health. India has been engaged in the healthcare
sector in Africa in a big way. The Pan Africa e-Network project, covering 54 countries of Africa, with Africa Union as the coordinating agency, has tele-medicine as a programme. Under this programme, medical practitioners at the Patient End locations can consult online Indian medical specialists in 12 super specialty hospitals in India. Five super specialty hospitals in Africa are also in the network. The Tele-Medicine network also provides continuing medical education services. (James, et al. 2015). The focus of the project is local capacity building, as it should be in SSC. China and Brazil have also been engaged in such collaborations through various fora such as, IBSA and BRICS. Access to affordable quality medicine is a major concern in almost all countries of the South. This is an area in which much has been contributed by SSC in the past. India has been a major generic drug supplier of the world. In fact, its generic medicines significantly contributed to the containment of HIV/AIDS in Africa as well as in South America.

In the light of the commitments of all countries towards the achievement of health for all by 2030, the SSC can play a more active role than in the past. This is especially so as quite a good number of countries of the South have miles to go to reach the set targets. In the matter of access to health care, many of them need to add significantly to their existing capacities in hospitals and dispensaries. Collaborative ventures, as per the requirements of the host country, can contribute in this. Health care also demands human resources and medicines and drugs. Countries like India in the past had provided health personnel in many countries. Apart from continuing to do so, they can also help in developing and expanding medical and paramedical education in other countries. In the area of medicines, there is need to develop local manufacturing capabilities in most countries. Joint ventures by countries who already have robust pharmaceutical industries such as China and India can boost this. These new ventures will have to keep in mind the paying capacity of the patients in the country where they are situated and not be unduly influenced by export potential to the developed countries. The joint ventures could also be a vehicle for technology transfer in the relevant field. With patents on a large number of medicines having expired in the recent years and more on the way, generic drug production can pick up in all the countries. But many of them have not developed the capabilities for the same which should be attended though the SSC projects. In entrepreneurial collaborations including starting new joint or other ventures, issues of regulatory approvals can come up. In order to encourage cooperation among Southern partners it may be necessary to have more harmonisation of such regulations including quality standards among them. It is necessary for all countries to develop domestic capacity for inspection mechanisms and regulatory agencies of their own which are to be as per their national requirements (James, Mellow and Reddy, 2018).

An area where SSC can and should focus is on pharmaceutical R&D. In the past, joint biomedical research has been in the fields of tuberculosis, malaria, HIV and AIDS and biotechnology (Chaturvedi and Thorsteinsdottir, 2012). While continuing these efforts there is need for collaboration in the areas of Neglected Tropical and
other Diseases. Large pharmaceutical firms from the North have little motivation to develop drugs for these diseases in view of the low paying capacity of the patients affected by the same. These diseases mostly affect the South and the South itself will have to explore the solutions. Collaborative research will greatly reduce the cost. R&D and collaboration should also extend to the area of medical devices. Diagnostic tests and surgical procedures are often costly and the stated reason is the high prices of the equipment’s and instruments. There is need to develop low cost but quality devices in developing countries and SSC can focus on the same.

Another sector for SSC is that of Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs). Since the times of the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations leading to the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement), the countries of the South were having much cooperation in this field in international fora like World Trade Organisation (WTO), World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) and World Health Organisation (WHO). It was the solidarity among them that led to the Doha Declaration on Public Health in 2001. But the trend towards including TRIPS plus provisions in bilateral free trade and investment agreements flags the need for more cooperation in this area. The TRIPS Agreement has provided for adequate flexibilities for countries in the IPR laws to take care of public health requirements including ensuring affordable access to health products. However, whenever countries try to implement such flexibilities like Compulsory Licenses there are concerted pressures on them from industrialised countries. Coordinated and collaborative efforts by South like the recommendation in the 2nd EAC Regional Pharmaceutical Plan of Action 2017-2027 to use public health related TRIPS flexibilities by the member countries of EAC, can make the use of the flexibilities much easier. Exchange of information on the use of compulsory licenses and other flexibilities can also be part of SSC. They can collaborate in areas of law and policy. Drafting of laws has to be as per the local conditions. Not all countries in the South have local expertise in drafting IP policies and laws. Some countries like India have drafted legislations in such a way as to fulfil the obligations under the TRIPS Agreement but providing innovative ways for preventing the ever-greening of patents. IP regimes must be in accordance with local realities. Many countries lack the capability to examine patent applications, particularly pharmaceutical patents; common IP offices with well qualified personnel and modern infrastructure can be made possible through SSC. Africa has already set up a Regional IP Office.

The health care narrative as it has developed over the years is based on a one system model, that is the allopathic system. In countries of the South like China, India, Sri Lanka, South Africa, etc. there are robust indigenous systems of medicine like Ayurveda, Chinese Medicine, etc. These indigenously grown systems can also effectively be used in providing universal health care and may be more conducive to the physiology of the people of the South than the Western system. SSC can extend to this field including R&D in them.

To conclude, SSC can play a significant role in the programmes of the South to achieve SDG 3. They should build on the
experiences which they have already had in this area and explore new opportunities. The basic principles of local ownership of the programmes and respecting national sovereignty should continue to guide them. An objective should be to develop local capacity and not merely passing on of goods and services. The cooperation has to be an outcome of shared goals and targets.

Endnotes
3 *Ibid*, p.8

References

**MYANMAR-SOUTH KOREA SIGN MOU FOR A ‘FRIENDSHIP BRIDGE’**

The Yangon regional government and South Korea-based Myanmar Company Wooree signed a memorandum of understanding for the Dala Industrial Development Project to be implemented on the west bank of Yangon River near the ongoing Yangon-Dala bridge project. The industrial development project will be a part of the Yangon-Dala bridge project which is a friendship bridge between Myanmar and South Korea. The Yangon-Dala bridge project agreement was reached under then-president Thein Sein’s government and is expected to cost $137.8 million in loans from South Korea’s Economic Development Cooperation Fund with the Myanmar government promising to provide an additional $30.3 million. The bridge will connect Phone Gyi Street in downtown Yangon with Bo Min Yaung Street in Dala Township. The bridge will benefit the industrial development project and will also support Yangon Region’s economic development.

The range and quantum of South-South Cooperation (SSC) expanded significantly in the past decade. India, as an emerging economy, has been an active player in development cooperation efforts with low-income countries in Asia and Africa. According to Chaturvedi, India’s development cooperation is based on a “development compact”.¹ The core principles of this development cooperation under the spirit of SSC are inclusivity, non-conditionality, demand-driven and mutually beneficial to India and the partner country.

A second LoC worth US$ 2 billion was announced during the Indian PM’s visit to Bangladesh in June 2015. This LoC would cover projects in areas of roads, railways, power, shipping, Special Economic Zones (SEZs), health and medical care, and technical education. LoCs on concessional terms through the EXIM Bank has become one of the main instruments of India’s development partnership with Bangladesh. These loans carry one per cent interest rate and 0.5 per cent commitment fee.² The repayment period would be 20 years with a moratorium period of five years. This is expected to create 50,000 jobs in Bangladesh. Such has been the impact of the first and second LoC to Bangladesh, that a third LoC of US$ 4.5 billion was operationalised in October 2017 during the two day visit of the Indian finance minister to Dhaka. This is by far the single largest credit line offered by India to any country, taking the total concessional credits extended to Bangladesh to more than US$7.3 billion.

India’s Development Cooperation with Bangladesh: A focus on Lines of Credit

Kaustuv Chakrabart*  

India’s Development cooperation with Bangladesh is based on the modern concept of a development compact which provides for development assistance that works at five different levels: trade and investment; technology exchange; skills upgradation; lines of credit (LoCs); and finally, grants. The demand driven development collaboration, is based on wider engagement across the five elements, which emphasises the comprehensive support for economic development.

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Development assistance through Indian LoCs and its socio-economic impact on the borrowing partner country had not been sufficiently analysed in a specific country context. Hence in 2017, PRIA undertook a study to explore the growing prominence of LoCs as a mode of India’s development cooperation with Bangladesh. This study focused on analysing the socio-economic impacts of the following four projects under the LoC of US$ 1 billion extended by India to Bangladesh from 2010.

- Construction of Second Bhairab Bridge
- Supply of 120 railway passenger coaches
- Supply of 10 broad gauge diesel electric locomotives
- Supply of 290 double-decker buses, 50 articulated and 88 single-decker air-conditioned Buses.

This article provides a brief glimpse of the findings of the study and makes a case for transparency in South-South cooperation through wider CSO and think tank participation vis-à-vis the economic and social implications of projects under bilateral South-South credit.

Findings

The study found that the Indian Lines of credit fills the necessary investment gap in Bangladesh’s transport sector which traditional donors like the World Bank and JICA had been skeptical of. Moreover, project selection and fund disbursements from the traditional providers require lengthier appraisal procedures. Therefore, the constraints of a shorter maturity period and tighter repayment conditions of LoCs are insignificant given the other benefits of acquiring relatively more cost-effective, speedy processing of funds and no attached conditions regarding governance and macroeconomic policy reforms (UNDP, 2016). The following are some of the findings of the study:

- **Multiple development cooperation instruments used simultaneously for holistic support**: India’s Development cooperation with Bangladesh is based on the modern concept of a development compact which provides for development assistance that works at five different levels: trade and investment; technology exchange; skills upgradation; lines of credit (LoCs); and finally, grants. The demand driven development collaboration, is based on wider engagement across the five elements, which emphasises the comprehensive support for economic development. Hence there is a scope to deploy other elements of development cooperation simultaneously for supply projects funded through LoCs in the partner country.

- **Unavailability of project specific information in the public domain**: Information regarding the implementation, monitoring and the impact of completed projects is not well documented and to make matters worse, such documentation is not available in the public domain. While conducting the primary research study on India’s development cooperation with Bangladesh, it was challenging for the authors at PRIA to find first-hand information about the planned projects, status of disbursements, and implementation under the second Indian LoC.

Officials at HCI in Dhaka are required to submit a project completion report (PCRs) to the Indian government and
EXIM Bank, capturing the present and future benefits of the project and its socio-economic impact on the region where the project is being implemented. In an interview with PRIA, members of CPD and Wave foundation of Bangladesh expressed that it is very challenging to carry out economic analysis because feasibility studies, which include analysis of the environmental impact of these projects, and monitoring reports are not shared in the public domain. It becomes an uphill task to access these for the concerned policymakers and stakeholders. Such lack of information also limits CSOs to make suggestions vis-à-vis the economic and social implications of projects under bilateral South-South credit.

• **Uncertainty about the benefits accrued to Bangladesh due to Indian LoC**: Socio-economic benefits derived from the projects funded by the Indian LoCs. The lack of data and information in the public domain gets perceived as lack of transparency and accountability. In interviews with PRIA, a leading think tank in Bangladesh has expressed concerns about the consistency and quality assurance of the projects undertaken with the credit, since there is no single central agency/authority supervising such financial transfers between ministries through binding rules and regulations guiding the financial flows. It is seen as the Development cooperation being practiced through closed official circuits, without discussions in the public sphere.

• **LoCs are demand driven, mutually beneficial and non-interfering**: In the spirit of SSC, the demand for the projects analysed in the study was generated by the Government of Bangladesh. As reflected in the UNDP report on concessional financial flows among Southern countries, the Bangladesh government was autonomous in identifying the projects and India did not interfere with the selection process. Projects under Indian LoCs to Bangladesh were targeted according to the country’s national development priorities under the Sixth Five Year Plan for market integration through developing transport networks at the domestic and regional levels with India and other neighbouring countries.

For Bangladesh, the LoC fills a necessary investment gap in its transport sector which traditional donors had been reluctant to finance. Infrastructure projects such as construction of the second Bhairab Bridge generate local employment of skilled and unskilled labour. Additionally, the supply projects under LoCs also contribute to local employment generation. For India, such development cooperation is not philanthropic. It allows for an increase in bilateral trade, where Indian contractors supply 75 per cent of goods and services and 65 per cent of construction materials from India.

Apart from the aforementioned conditions, the, development cooperation extended through LoCs lives up to the normative aspect of non-interference in domestic affairs of the recipient country.

**Policy recommendations**

Given the growth of India’s development cooperation with Bangladesh and the growing importance of LoCs as a modality, the study puts forth the
following recommendations:

- **Using multiple development cooperation instruments in tandem to build local capacities:**

  Through its development compact, India not only provides concessional finance to Bangladesh through LoCs, but there is also a component of capacity building, skills and technology transfer. Financial assistance through LoCs provides Bangladesh with much needed investment in infrastructure as well as an avenue for training to build the capacity of Bangladeshi personnel to operate and maintain the assets procured under the supply projects. For example, 100 drivers have been trained to drive the double-decker buses supplied. Building capacities through trainings has a long-term impact on employment generation, economic growth and poverty reduction. Such trainings reduce the dependence of Bangladesh by capacitating the local population not only to maintain the assets but also to reverse engineer the spare parts, thereby reducing the overall loan component in the long run. Hence, it not only builds the capacity of the local professionals but also facilitates the transfer of skills and technology.

  Under the 2015 guidelines on the LoC’s extended by the GoI under the IDEAS6, one of the priorities of India would be to support in setting up adequate network of servicing facilities by exporters through LoCs. It might be relevant to set up local spare parts manufacturing facilities while training modules can be designed to provide regular trainings to technicians and mechanics to enable them to repair and maintain procured vehicles/coaches with ease. This would reduce the loan component for the borrowing government and simultaneously generate local employment and facilitate knowledge transfers.

  Apart from developing individual capacities through trainings of individuals, future Indian LoCs should aim to facilitate developing substantive, institutional and infrastructural capacities in partner countries. However, since only Indian organisations participate in the tendering process and, implementation of projects, this limits the scope of organisations and firms from the partner countries to participate and enhance their capacities through “learning by doing”. In the spirit of mutual benefit, knowledge transfer can be achieved if these LoC conditionalities can be modified to allow Indian organisations to collaborate with organisations from the partner countries. Preference can be given to those proposals which contribute to developing local capacities by partnering with local organisations.

- **Making the information related to project appraisal, implementation, monitoring and impact public**

  The guiding framework of South–South development finance is evolving and it is flexible while the financial transfers take place bilaterally. The terms of LoC from India, is at first negotiated by the ERD under the MoF, Bangladesh. Following which the project-wise allocation is made directly to the concerned ministries under which the selected projects are to be implemented. One of the major limitations reported by the EXIM Bank of India is that the reports submitted by Bangladesh
are made on an ad hoc basis which does not provide an analytical insight into the accrued benefits and shortcomings of the project. Hence, it is advisable to make it mandatory for the borrowing government to follow the 2015 guidelines which warrant the borrowing government to make public the information on projects sought to be undertaken under the Indian LoC. This can be attributed to the fact that there is no clearly defined central reporting system in the borrowing country. The LoC guidelines of 2015 of Government of India warrant that quarterly monitoring and evaluation reports should be prepared. These will help monitor implementation status of the projects, calculate the rate of return on investment and assess the socio-economic impacts of the project. In order to maintain such reporting and information, there is a need to set up a central reporting system in the borrowing country.

According to the 2015 guidelines on LoC extended by the EXIM Bank of India to various countries under IDEAS, the borrowing government is supposed to prepare and submit a comprehensive project completion report to the Indian mission, highlighting the benefits derived/to be derived from the project, and its socio-economic impact. If such reports are made public, it will allow civil society, think tanks and other stakeholders to analyse the benefits of such partnerships and document the good practices.

- **Civil society engagement in India’s development cooperation**

The roles of indigenous CSOs in national and sub-national development has been well recognised. Civil society organisations in India and Bangladesh are a repository of experience and expertise in the field of poverty reduction, women’s empowerment, social protection, and community development. Apart from implementing projects, some Indian CSOs are well known for their knowledge building. In the past decade Indian CSOs have also extended their contributions to transnational development activities. Given their experience, the CSOs can address the needs of the most marginalised, engage in multi-stakeholder learning and capacity building, deepen ownership, mutual trust and accountability, and promote local action through global coalition building.

According to the 2015 LoC guidelines of the Indian government, the Indian mission in the borrowing country will need to report to the Indian government the long-term economic benefits of LoC. In this context, it is recommended that the Indian missions could engage those civil society organisations with strong roots in the community and think tanks in the borrowing country during the project planning stage and during both economic and social impact assessment of LoC projects. Participation of civil society organisations in development cooperation should be project specific and is likely to ensure greater transparency, accountability and public participation. Indian CSOs can be engaged during the project monitoring and evaluation stage, as well as in the impact assessment stage. As per the 2015 guidelines, the EXIM bank of India can appoint a Lender’s Engineer at its cost for independent monitoring of the project. Similar provisions should be
made to cover the cost of civil society organisations being appointed by EXIM bank to independently monitor the progress of the project and its socio-economic and environmental impacts. This should factor in the necessary support to be provided by all the stakeholders of the project.

CSOs can be engaged to collate the socio-economic benefits accruing to the community. This can be a powerful advocacy tool in strengthening ties both at the bilateral level and between the people of both countries. It is relevant to study the impact of India’s development cooperation given the development compact and closely examine in future the benefits accrued through the following modalities:

- capacity building and skills transfer
- concessional finance (further divided into grants and lines of credit)
- preferential trade
- investment
- technical cooperation

At an international level, the documentation of good practices of India’s development cooperation will further India’s diplomacy

- **Linking impacts of LoC to SDGs to exhibit the mutual gains of the partners.**

Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) stress the importance of South-South cooperation in implementing the 2030 agenda. Goal 17, “Revitalize the global partnership for sustainable development,” particularly emphasises on the critical role of South-South Cooperation in achieving this ambitious development agenda. It also set targets for South-South and Triangular Cooperation that target both technology and capacity-building in which all countries have committed to achieve.

Such concessional credits to Bangladesh should be extended with the aim to promote the development, transfer, dissemination and diffusion of environmentally sound technologies on mutually agreed favourable terms, including on concessional and preferential terms. It must enhance the use of enabling technology such as information and communications technology. Such transfer of affordable and adaptable technology might be instrumental in reducing the reliance of Bangladesh on imports and increase its exports, thereby enabling it to reduce its trade deficit. This contributes to India’s SDG 17 target of increasing the exports of Bangladesh. One of the targets of India under SDG 9, has a responsibility to facilitate sustainable and resilient infrastructure development through enhanced financial, technological and technical support to least developed countries like Bangladesh. A sizeable portion of the concessional finance has been invested in building infrastructure of both domestic and cross border connectivity. This will play an important role in promoting inclusive and sustainable industrialisation and increase the industry’s share of employment and gross domestic product, eventually contributing to Bangladesh’s national goal and SDG of reducing poverty.

Explicit mention of India’s contribution in Bangladesh achieving its SGDs along with India’s own commitment under SDG 17 might be crucial in depicting the benefits of India’s development cooperation and its espoused values.
Endnotes


3 These projects were selected in the study since they were completed or on the verge of completion, otherwise analysing projects would have been far more challenging.


6 Indian Development and Economic Assistance Scheme (IDEAS).

SIWI HOSTS WORLD WATER WEEK, 26 – 31 AUGUST, 2018

World Water Week is the annual focal point for the globe’s water issues. It is organised by the Stockholm International Water Institute. In 2018, World Water Week addressed the theme “Water, ecosystems and human development”. In 2017 over 3,300 individuals and around 380 convening organizations from 135 countries participated. The organizations were a mix of Non-Governmental Organizations, Private Sector, Research and Academic, Intergovernmental Agencies, Governmental Agencies and Media houses. An increasing youth participation with 25% of individuals under the age of 35 years was visible. For this Week, experts, practitioners, decision-makers, business innovators and young professionals from a range of sectors and countries come to Stockholm to network, exchange ideas, foster new thinking and develop solutions to the most pressing water-related challenges of today.

SIWI’s Executive Director Torgny Holmgren highlighted the need to recognize the many values attached to water, be it economic, social, environmental, cultural or religious. Taking steps towards SGD6, C40, an organization that gathers mayors of cities worldwide, told World Water Week participants about the risks that big cities face from climate change and how water is key to mitigation and adaptation efforts.

The World Water Week hosted an event taking stock of water in the implementation of both Agenda 2030 and the Paris Climate Agreement. Addressing the event, Hungarian President János Áder said the world needs a more focused global effort towards tackling water challenges. Water is key to our future prosperity and together, we can achieve a water wise world.

Source: http://www.worldwaterweek.org/world-water-week-closes-values-of-water-must-be-better-understood/
In recent years, the foreign policies of Brazil and India have favoured South-South relations, resulting in an unprecedented enhancement of bilateral economic ties between the two regional giants, especially in the trade of goods and services. However, cooperation within other important sectors, such as defence and security, is still incipient. Insofar as international cooperation constitutes a significant component for the development and maintenance of national defence systems, this paper provides a preliminary exploration of the potential pathways and prospects for a greater Indo-Brazilian cooperation on defence.

Some observers have identified common traits for Brazil and India and described how these traits can favour mutual collaboration and policy coordination (Alden and Vieira, 2005; Hirst, 2008; Fan et al. 2008; Roubini, 2009; Marchán, 2012; Ray, 2015). According to these interpretations, bilateral cooperation between the two countries can stem from and be facilitated by a common past of colonialism as well as similar social problems; large territories, populations and domestic markets; and democratic political systems. In the defence realm, both countries have structures that are dysfunctional and expensive, preventing the military from making optimal choices. According to theory and practice, such commonalities lower transaction and learning costs, and support coordination between nations (Keohane, 1984; Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000). Thus, through collaboration, states may obtain greater benefits than they would when acting unilaterally.

Characteristics suggest great potential for synergy with Indian partners, considering the fact that India is at the forefront of numerous technological processes and hosts many leading companies operating in segments considered as priorities by Brazil. Moreover, Indian exporters in the defence sector can seize the opportunities presented by the favourable import-tax structure in the Brazilian defence sector.
This paper also argues that even the differences between Brazil and India, especially in terms of defence, provide ample scope for cooperation under the logic of complementarity, in which bilateral relations may result in the mutual supply of resources that each side lacks, thus enhancing the value of both nations (Kreps et al., 1982; Yao, 2011). Arms deals comprise one area in which this logic can be used. Although India has been the world’s biggest arms importer for nearly a decade (Blanchfield et al., 2017) as well as a respectable arms exporter (Banerjee, 2018), bilateral defence trade with Brazil is insignificant (Wezeman et al., 2018). In this case, the difference between the countries could actually be a catalyst for enhanced bilateral relations based on complementary needs.

Perhaps no other area displays greater prospects for mutual benefits and potential for enhanced Indo-Brazilian cooperation in defence matters than industry. In this area, both countries can coordinate industrial policies, enhance bilateral trade of military equipment and systems, and make joint investments in company formation, research, development, and sales. India has a sizeable defence budget and purchasing power; by contrast, Brazil must modernize its defence industry and improve the sales of its defence products. Being the world’s largest arms importer in recent times, India is in a privileged position to favour Brazilian products and co-finance bilateral initiatives. In addition, Brazilian defence companies and agencies can team up with Indian counterparts for the development of new products, acting as a gateway for Indian defence products in Latin America.

India’s favourable position in the global defence marketplace contrasts with the numerous obstacles faced by Brazil. To understand the challenges of modernizing Brazil’s military and to identify priority policy areas suitable for bilateral policy coordination, it is important to examine the history of the Brazilian defence industry. This history can be divided into four periods: 1822-1945; 1945-1964; 1964-1990; and 1990-2018. The developments observed in these periods have occurred vis-à-vis a number of strategic, political, social, and economic changes that have defined contemporary Brazil.

The beginning of first period corresponds to the Brazilian Independence from Portugal and, more specifically, to the aftermath of Brazil’s participation in the Paraguayan War, the deadliest and bloodiest interstate conflict in Latin America’s history (Whigham and Potthast, 1999). According to Amarante (2004), this period contained the ‘cycle of military factories’, in which the country sought to create a domestic web of firms responsible for the production of essential military goods (e.g., ammunition) to supply the armed forces. This was done to allow the military to promptly defend the country from external and internal threats (especially separatist movements). Nonetheless, the indigenous production of military goods was unable to supply the needs of the military; thus, the country kept on being dependent on foreign suppliers (Andrade, 2016). This period also encompassed the so-called French Mission (1919), which stimulated Brazil to purchase French military equipment, and Brazilian participation in the Second World War fought in Italy alongside the United States, which led the country to
acquire military equipment from its North American ally.

The second period begins at the end of the Second World War, when the Brazilian government, in line with domestic macro- and microeconomic policies, decided to invest in technological development to encourage the indigenous defence production (ABDI/IPEA, 2016). In this period, government policies in the defence sector created a number of state-owned defence enterprises as well as institutions of higher education and technological centres\(^2\) under each armed force. This resulted in the formation and training of managerial leaders and specialized technical staff and in the development of complete industrial cycles – from conception to selling – for defence products (Amarante, 2004; IPEA/ABDI, 2016).

The third period coincided with the military regime in Brazil, in which the defence industry expanded through the emergence of new state-owned defence enterprises, reaping the benefits of the structural developments occurred in the previous period (Andrade et al., 2016). This period was marked by an unprecedented growth in the Brazilian defence industry, enabling the country, which had an insignificant presence in the international arms markets in the 1970s (Pim, 2007), to become the world’s fifth largest exporter of defence products by the 1980s (CREDEN, 2015).

The fourth period coincided with the redemocratization of the country after the military regime and is still developing to date. Insofar as there have been relevant institutional developments\(^3\) in the defence sector recently, this period has been characterized by a decline of the national defence industry caused by internal and, to an extent, external factors. Internally, serious successive economic and fiscal crises and a wave of privatizations of domestic companies have led the government to reduce defence purchases from its native suppliers. Moreover, according to Flemes and Vaz (2011), ‘the absence of immediate conventional threats to its security from within the region brought about an acute questioning of the raison d’être of its armed forces and provided no incentives for defense spending’ (p. 12). These developments have caused adverse effects in the financing and development of products and assembly lines, harming the entry of goods and services ‘made in Brazil’ into the global defence marketplace. Externally, the end of the Cold War lead to an immediate decrease in arms sales globally as well as the cheap global supply of defence products from the former Soviet Union (Sandler and Hartley, 2007).

More recently, the Brazilian defence industry benefited from the growth of military expenditure in numerous countries in the first decade of the 2000s, which provided a boost following the decline in the 1990s (IPEA/ABDI 2016). Brazilian arms exports in this period were dominated by the sale of military aircraft, notably EMBRAER’s Super Tucano, which accounted for approximately 80 per cent of Brazilian military exports between 2005 and 2011 (Andrade, 2016). Amongst other Brazilian defence products that have had relative success in the global arms marketplace, the most notable are missiles, armoured vehicles, ground systems and radars (Brick, 2014). The main buyers of Brazilian products are other South American nations, which account for a little over half of the sector’s
exports (IPEA/ABDI, 2016). A recent study showed that the sector is formed by 40 exporting firms that had a turnover of approximately US$ 4 billion in 2013, generating approximately 30,000 direct and 120,000 indirect jobs (Gambôa, 2013).

Correspondingly, the main characteristics of contemporary Brazilian defence industry (Brick, 2013; Schmidt et al., 2013; Andrade, 2016; IPEA/ABDI, 2016) are as follows:

- Partial technological autonomy – apart from rare exceptions, the more complex the product, system, or component made by the Brazilian defence industry is, the more dependent the product is on the purchase and adaptation of foreign technology in the production process;
- Incomplete productive structure – key defence industrial sectors exist in which indigenous productive structures are practically non-existent, such as the case of weapons and ammunition electronic systems and command and control systems as well as military ground platforms;
- Few national leading firms – only a few industrial segments of the Brazilian defence industry have so-called ‘anchor firms’ that exhibit a sustainable business scale (productive and financial) compatible with international standards or that are sufficiently independent from foreign input.
- Tax deficiencies – the amount by which the firm’s correct tax liability exceeds the amount reported on the tax return. In fact, tax asymmetry favours imports in all sectors of the Brazilian defence industry. In addition, the sectors with the highest export coefficient present an accumulation of tax credits that has a negative impact on the profitability and costs of large exporting companies.
- Discrepancies of the national productive structure – although some defence products directly benefit from the high degree of international competitiveness of some Brazilian industrial sectors (e.g., metalworking and mechanics), the deficiencies of other sectors (e.g., information technology) impairs product development that relies on the deficient sectors.

These characteristics suggest great potential for synergy with Indian partners, considering the fact that India is at the forefront of numerous technological processes and hosts many leading companies operating in segments considered as priorities by Brazil. Moreover, Indian exporters in the defence sector can seize the opportunities presented by the favourable import-tax structure in the Brazilian defence sector. Furthermore, a cursory examination of both countries defence policies (or statutes) and legal frameworks indicates that India and Brazil seem to have convergent goals and complementary defence needs. For example, Brazil has set its defence production priorities in eight industrial segments that could be of interest of Indian partners (IPEA/ABDI, 2016: MD, 2012c): 1) light weapons; 2) ammunition and explosives; 3) nonlethal weapons; 4) weapons and ammunition electronic systems and command and control systems; 5) military ground platforms; 6) military aerospace platforms; 7) military naval platforms; and 8) nuclear propulsion.

As outlined in Brazil’s National Defence Strategy, these eight segments involve the three fundamental strategic programmes...
of the defence sector: 1) the nuclear programme led by the navy; 2) the cybernetic programme coordinated by the army; and 3) the space programme managed by the air force (MD, 2012a; MD, 2012b).

As a concluding remark, cooperation between Brazil and India in defence matters should explore possibilities and synergic needs beyond the industrial realm. At the strategic level, both countries should engage in a consistent process of defence policy coordination, taking onboard each other’s strategic policies, programmes and projects. At the operational level, India and Brazil should intensify and expand initiatives such as military education exchanges; joint training, exercises and simulations; sharing of best practices; high-level visits; joint research and development; and establishment of defence technology-related partnerships.

**Endnotes**


3 Throughout the last Century, the Brazilian armed forces have established a broad set of institutions related to research and development, as well as formation and training of human resources at the strategic, technical and operational levels. These, in turn, have supported the creation, expansion and consolidation of diverse segments of the Brazilian defence industry. The Brazilian Air Force has the Technological Centre of the Air Force (CTA), an umbrella organization that has several institutes - especially the Technological Institute of the Air Force (ITA). Under the Brazilian Army, the Technological Institute of the Army (CTEx) and the Military Institute of Engineering (IME), Research and Development Institute (IPD) and Institute of Special Projects (IPE) stand out. The Brazilian Navy has the Institute of Navy Research (IPqM) and the Navy Technological Centre in São Paulo (CTMSP).

The 1988 Federal Constitution is the main legal instrument that dictates the organization of the defence sector in Brazil, which is also regulated by a number of laws and other statutes. Under the Federal Constitution, the National Defence Policy, the National Defence Strategy and the National Defence White Paper are an essential part of an ample legal framework that guide the organization and modernization of the Brazilian military.

The National Defence Policy is the country’s highest-level document on defense matters and defines the so-called National Fundamental Objectives for the sector. The National Defense Strategy, in turn, is the plan of action to be taken by the country in order to achieve such Objectives, determining the bases on which the defence of the country must be structured. The National Defense White Paper is in line with the best democratic practices encouraged by the United Nations, especially public transparency, being the main document through which the Brazilian government shares information with citizens and foreigners about national defence.

In this context, the National Defence White Paper offers the public (national and international) information about the context of the current international strategic environment according to the Brazilian state, describing a) the existing military sector of Brazil; b) the relationship between the defence sector and the Brazilian society at large; c) the pathways for the modernization of the Armed Forces; and d) the relevance of the defence industry. According to the Constitution, the President of the Republic is the commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces, which are formed by the Brazilian Army (Exército Brasileiro), Brazilian Navy (Marinha do Brasil, including the Navy Air Force and the Marines), and Brazilian Air Force (Força Aérea Brasileira). They are permanent and regular national institutions and organized on the basis of hierarchy and discipline.

Their mission involves the defence of
the motherland, the protection of the constitutional branches of power and, by order of any of these branches, the protection of law and order, with the aim of preserving state sovereignty and federal union.

Additionally, the Armed Forces also cooperate with national development and civil defence. In specific cases, in the light of particular legal provisions, the Armed Forces may also act, in partnership with the country’s police forces and specific government agencies, in crime fighting and law enforcement within the country’s territory, including its borderlands, airspace, sea and rivers. All three institutions are under the Ministry of Defence, which guides, supervises and coordinates all actions of the Armed Forces. The creation of the Ministry of Defence in 1999 is arguably the most important institutional development in the defence sector since the end of the military regime in 1985.

The Ministry of Defence is a government body of the federal public administration under the Executive branch and is responsible for coordinating joint defence efforts; protecting the national sovereignty; safeguarding the constitutional branches of powers, law and order, national assets and interests; and contributing to Brazil’s participation in international security efforts (such as peacekeeping missions). Moreover, the Ministry of Defence has authority over various matters, which include joint military operations; defence budget; military policies and strategies; strategic intelligence; science, technology and innovation; health; national mobilization; and military service, among other issues.

For a comprehensive online list of Defence sector-related legislation in Brazil (in Portuguese only), please access https://www.defesa.gov.br/index.php/institucional/iv-base-juridica-paramar-atuacao-do-md

There are three main exceptions to this characteristic. The first is the technological capability being built autonomously in the nuclear propulsion sector, even though it is the sector with the highest technological intensity. The second is EMBRAER’s competence in the development, production and marketing of some categories of military aircraft. Finally, there is the case of technological efforts carried out by Brazil’s Atech Foundation in developing integrated surveillance and intelligence systems (IPEA/ABDI, 2016).

References


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The inking of the Financial Grant and a Technical Cooperation Agreement follows the 2017 Governmental Negotiations on Development Cooperation between Germany and Namibia. To date, German development cooperation with Namibia – governmental and non-governmental programmes taken together amounts to more than 1 billion Euros, approximately N$15 billion. In per-capita terms, Namibia is thus the largest recipient of German development cooperation in Africa. The two agreements inched cover programmes to the value of roughly N$1.1 billion, financing among others projects on Bush Control and Biomass Utilisation, Promotion of Vocational Education and Training, Promotion of Business Advisory and Transformational Services, Support to Management of Public Enterprises, Integrated Wildlife Protection Management and Integrated National Park Management. These agreements are complemented by a Financial Cooperation Agreement on interest-subsidized loans, to be concluded with the Ministry of Finance. Namibia and Germany have agreed on three focal areas of the partnership, namely: Natural Resources Management, Sustainable Economic Development Transport/Logistics. Furthermore to bilateral government cooperation, there are a large number of programmes run by non-governmental players such as churches, political foundations, NGOs or private initiatives.

Two important questions on the norms of South-South cooperation (SSC) have contributed to some intense debates over the last few years. The first relates to the relevance or otherwise of evaluation of interventions under SSC, while the second involves the necessity of a common standardized template for reporting of flow of resources. The present paper attempts to look at these issues through a Southern lens and argues that none of them are either relevant or desirable.

Development Cooperation need not necessarily be strictly contractual. It can also flow out of solidarity and friendship as has been characterized by the ever-emerging importance of South-South Cooperation. Such cooperation models do not rely on a set of contractual obligations, often referred to in the literature as conditionalities or mutual accountability. The first shot at development cooperation in modern history as exemplified in the operationalisation between 1947 and 1951 of the Marshall Plan, officially known as the European Recovery Programme, after the Second World War, was not beset with contractual obligations between the donors and the donees. It was a saga of horizontal cooperation, in keeping with the spirit of solidarity expressed towards the European communities that were badly devastated by the War. The effort was a huge success in terms of its impact as well. The official website of The George C. Marshall Foundation notes, “Sixteen nations, including Germany, became part of the program and shaped the assistance they required, state by state, with administrative and technical
assistance provided through the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) of the United States. European nations received nearly $13 billion in aid, which initially resulted in shipments of food, staples, fuel and machinery from the United States and later resulted in investment in industrial capacity in Europe”1 (emphasis added). Europe limped back to normalcy in a couple of decades, if not less.

The initial and visible success of the Marshall Plan “From 1948 through 1952 European economies grew at an unprecedented rate. Trade relations led to the formation of the North Atlantic alliance. Economic prosperity led by coal and steel industries helped to shape what we know now as the European Union”2 – perhaps led to its potential replication in the newly independent developing world with the declaration of the Point Four Programme by Harry Truman in 1949 as an extension of his Doctrine announced in 1947. He called for a “‘bold new program for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped nations’. The resulting Point Four program (so-called because it was the fourth point in Truman’s speech) resulted in millions of dollars in scientific and technical assistance–as well as hundreds of U.S. experts–sent to Latin American, Asian, Middle Eastern, and African nations.”3

In about a decade the USAID was born in 1961. Many other developed countries copied the model of development cooperation initiated by the USA and the Development Assistance Group (DAG) was created as a forum for consultations among donors on assistance to developing countries in 1960 even before the establishment of the USAID as part of an extraordinary surge in aid-related institutional developments, which laid the foundation for the current aid system4. The founding members of DAG were Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, the United Kingdom, the United States, the Commission of the European Economic Community, Japan, and the Netherlands. With the establishment of Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), DAG became the Development Assistance Committee (DAC), holding its first meeting on 5 October 1961. The first annual DAC High Level Meeting was convened in July 1962 that issued agreed Directives for Reporting Aid and Resource Flows to Developing Countries on a comparable basis. In 1963, DAC adopted a Resolution on the Terms and Conditions of Aid, recommending that DAC members ensure that the terms of aid are adapted to the circumstances of each developing country or group of countries. The directives were to serve as the basis for the first Recommendation on Financial Terms and Conditions (1965), setting the standards for official development assistance (ODA). DAC was also designated as the authoritative monitoring hub for its member countries’ ODA, maintaining a comprehensive statistical database and publishing regular reports that serve as the basis for ODA references, analyses and comparisons5. Subsequently, the DAC principles for evaluation of development assistance came out in 1991 that identified the five criteria of evaluation – relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability (REELIS) – that are considered the main components of evaluation strategy of development cooperation followed by the OECD member countries. By 2006,
William Easterly came out with his arguments in “White Man’s Burden” that delineates “Why the West’s Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done So Much Ill and So Little Good”. Almost during the same time Elinor Ostrom with her colleagues published “The Samaritan’s Dilemma: The Political Economy of Development Aid” (2005) to argue that “aid’s failure is related to the institutions that structure its delivery”. Needless to add, it was during this period that Paris Declaration in 2005 called for aid effectiveness and identified five principles – ownership, alignment, harmonization, results and mutual accountability – to achieve the goal of effective development cooperation.

Two Issues

Two points deserve our attention at this juncture of this write up. Firstly, Marshall Plan never worked out to be a “White Man’s Burden” or a “Samaritan’s Dilemma” and the targeted objectives were achieved beyond doubt. However, it was bereft of any conditionalities or contractual obligations on the part of any of the parties to the process of cooperation. On the other hand, efforts following the lessons learnt from the former could not lead to the desired level of success as far as the “effectiveness” of DAC-led initiatives in the Southern world is concerned, in spite of the terms and conditions specified by the DAC vis-à-vis ODA that were aimed at a “comparative” and rigorous monitoring and evaluation of the initiatives to ensure that the contractual obligations are fulfilled by all the parties engaged. World Bank (1996), McMahon (1997), Morrison (2005), Killick (2008) and Kodera (2016) provide ample evidences on the “not so effective” results out of DAC-led interventions in development cooperation in spite of ex-ante contractual obligations specified in clear terms.

Secondly, the increasingly important role of South-South Cooperation (SSC) as a viable vehicle for development cooperation has also caught attention of development practitioners with a fervent demand for efforts to ensure “effectiveness” of SSC through rigorous monitoring and evaluation of the relevant interventions. Creation of a standardized template, like the ones designed by DAC to capture the flow of resources through SSC is another expectation emanating clearly. Establishment in 2013 of Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC) is a visible move in that direction in an effort to engage the Southern partners in agreeing to adhere to a standardized template of resource flow and emulating the strict monitoring and evaluation guidelines as are followed by the countries linked to DAC. Incidentally, most of the influential actors in the field of SSC, like China, India, Brazil and South Africa, refused to join the bandwagon of GPEDC.

The Issues Examined

We concentrate on the second issue first and will take up the first while concluding. Is it desirable and/or feasible to design a standardized template for accounting the resource flow under SSC? Further, are SSC efforts amenable to monitoring and evaluation? To take up the arguments vis-à-vis evaluation, let us consider Table 1 that compares evaluation and assessment. The table clearly suggests that evaluation, as opposed to assessment, is based on some criteria determined by the evaluator who enjoys seat of judgement to ascertain the worth and merit of an intervention...
against a pre-defined standard. Thus, the process is almost entirely under the control of the evaluator. An assessment, on the other hand, provides space for the assesse to participate in the process of setting the criteria and have some control on the assessment activities as well. In other words, assessment is more participatory than evaluation in identifying the gains and losses through a development cooperation engagement.

It needs emphasis at this juncture that SSC, in view of the expressed non-negotiable principles followed since its initiation and institutionalized in the outcome document of the High-level United Nations Conference on South-South Cooperation, held in Nairobi in December 2009 (see General Assembly resolution 64/222), is bereft of any contractual agreement between the parties engaged in such cooperative “sharing” (like the process engaged in the Marshall Plan). Implemented out of a concern to express solidarity to newly decolonized countries facing developmental challenges, SSC has been horizontal and never involved “conditions” thereby rendering the supports to be purely demand driven and as opposed to becoming similar to “white man’s burden”, help the partners in reaping “mutual benefits”. A typical sharing of resources within the domain of SSC

- May extend over a long period of time, but the duration is often not specified in advance;
- Involves a large variety of exchanges and occur in a package consisting of highly interdependent transactions, in tune with the ideas of Development Compact;
- Is not specifically identified beforehand, most of them are contingent on events and are decided sequentially;
- Does not necessarily balance in terms of a unit of account;
- Is enforced by internal values shared by the members;
- Creates a collective identity that affects the transactions of each member with

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<th>Table 1: Comparison between Assessment and Evaluation</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Purpose</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Assessment: To improve future performance</td>
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<td>Evaluation: To judge the merit or worth of a performance against a predefined standard</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Setting Criteria</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Assessment: Both the assesse and the assessor choose the criteria</td>
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<td>Evaluation: The evaluator determines the criteria</td>
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<td><strong>Control</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Assessment: The assesse – who can choose to make use of assessment feedback</td>
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<td>Evaluation: The evaluator – who is able to make a judgement which impacts the evaluatee</td>
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<td><strong>Depth of Analysis</strong></td>
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<td>Assessment: Thorough analysis by answering questions such as why and how to improve future performance</td>
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<td>Evaluation: Calibration against a standard</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Response</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assessment: Positive outlook of implementing and action plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation: Closure with failure or success</td>
</tr>
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</table>

*Source: Parker et al. 2001.*
people outside the group;
• Is specific and non-transferable.

Such features in exchange of resources mimic that between friends or that within the members of a family (Ben Porath 1980). In the absence of any ex-ante contractual obligations - not specifically identified beforehand, most of them are contingent on events and are decided sequentially - it is not possible to make a judgement on worth or merit of an SSC intervention against a pre-determined standard. The explicit mention of outcomes of an intervention in a contractual framework paves the way both for having a pre-determined standard and thereby specifying the domains of mutual accountability. Being sequential in its approach, the standards may be ever evolving and changing over time. The identification of the domains of mutual accountability is also rendered difficult.

However, there is no denial of the fact that being involved in transfer of resources from citizens of one country to another, SSC be left without any understanding and examination of the worth and merit of the interventions involved. Being an effort to enhance the level of solidarity among the Southern nations, southern partners also have the responsibility to share the impacts – positive or otherwise – of an intervention to the rest of the Southern countries so as to help them identify some best practices that may be implemented with necessary adjustments to contribute to their developmental aspirations. Under such circumstances, in the absence of any ex-ante contractual benchmark, it is desirable that SSC is not evaluated but assessed to not only facilitate improvements in future performance, but also ascertain the extent of mutual benefit flowing to the countries in partnership.

It may be done through an exercise that involves both the parties in exchange to determine the criteria for assessment with the assessee in control of the assessment process so that it may utilize the feedback to its benefit. Therefore, SSC need not go through the paces of evaluation, it must develop a mutually agreeable method of assessment of “mutual benefits” out of their cooperation in solidarity.

Such a stand in favour of assessment of “mutual benefits” also automatically rules out the need for a standard template for reporting of resource flow in respect of SSC. As we observed, SSC does not involve any contractual agreement between the partners involved. The driving force of SSC is the quest for mutual benefit and the nature of support is sequential, often not decided ex-ante. Further, as it is revealed, a good share of the support extended is difficult to be measured in monetary units and hence will be difficult to be covered in any standardized template. On top of that, as the principles of SSC suggest, unlike the DAC-led development cooperation process, resource flow in SSC is not unidirectional. Bi-directional flow of resources is too complex to be captured in a standard template, given the multiple possible modalities, multiple actors and simultaneous use of monetized and non-monetized flow of resources. It is desirable that SSC practitioners consciously refrain from any effort to go for such a standardized template to capture resource flow.

Before we conclude, let us refer to the first issue raised earlier about the failure of the DAC-led efforts to ensure effectiveness. It may be noted that the criteria for evaluation identified by DAC did not consider the need to evaluate if
the contracts were at all fulfilled from the donors’ side. The five evaluation criteria (REEIS), were all considered from the perspective of the donees and the evaluations were aimed to ascertain if the donees performed as contracted. The absence of a criterion to evaluate if the contractual commitments were fulfilled by the donors might have contributed considerably to diminish the effectiveness of the DAC-led interventions. More about this issue in a later issue.

Endnotes
1  https://www.marshallfoundation.org/marshall/the-marshall-plan/history-marshall-plan/
2  https://www.marshallfoundation.org/marshall/the-marshall-plan/history-marshall-plan/
3  https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/truman-announces-point-four-program
4  The historical obligation to set right the scars of colonialism also contributed to the efforts at providing development aid
6  http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/parisdeclarationandaccraagendaforaction.htm

References
EU-China-Africa Trilateral Relations in a Multipolar World: Hic Sunt Dracones

Author: Anna Katharina Stahl; London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018; ISBN 9781137587015; xxiii+228pp.; €100.00

EU-China-Africa Trilateral Relations in a multipolar world by Anna Katharina Stahl is the book, which is mindful of the evolving global order. The introduction of the book explicitly mentions the rise of global South and the end of the bipolar world. The author explains that the term “Global South” is concerned with the countries of China, India, Brazil and South Africa, with two main characteristics in common. Firstly, all the above-mentioned countries have experienced exceptional economic growth. Since the 1990s China, India, Brazil and South Africa have achieved a considerable expansion of their economies, especially in comparison to the slow growth rates of the USA and the EU. Due to their extraordinary economic growth these four rising powers have also gained significant political influence, at both the regional and the global level. Secondly, the four countries in focus had been colonised by Western powers at different times of their histories. According to the author, this colonial past is a major rallying point for these countries to distinguish themselves to be developing countries from the South in spite of their recent economic and political rise.

The inspiration of studying and analysing China as against other Southern countries vis-a-vis the European Union (EU) and Africa is based on its penetration in the African continent and due to its size – in terms of geography, population and economy. China’s GDP grew considerably more than that of the other three emerging countries. The rapid economic growth of China has also

* Author is Ph.D a student of UN University of Peace, Costa Rica.
led the country to acquire political heft in the international system. Its global overtures such as Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) along with its presence in the BRICS and New Development Bank (NDB) have provided China with leveraging chip in the global community. For a long time, Africa has been considered the forgotten continent. It is now the home to six of the ten fastest growing economies and sometimes referred to as the world’s new growth engine. African countries have made significant progress in meeting the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Against the context of an emerging multipolar world, the role of the EU in international affairs is changing. In order to remain a relevant international player, European policymakers have started realising that they need to reach out to China and Africa. The intensification of Sino-African relations bears important consequences for the European Union (EU), which traditionally considers Africa as its own backyard.

Against this background, the book describes the trilateral relations between the EU, China, and Africa, carried out at the Institute for European Studies (IES) of the Vrije Universiteit Brussel (VUB) in collaboration with the Brussels Institute of Contemporary China Studies (BICCS). Departing from a European point of view, the research shows that the EU has started adapting its foreign policy to the emerging multipolar world order and presents new evidence for emerging EU-China-Africa trilateral relations. The book is unique in another sense. Most books on international relations and development studies pay emphases on bilateral and multilateral relations between nation states. But, this book investigates the trilateral relations between EU, China and Africa. Also, the EU as an entity (bloc) is being studied perhaps for the first vis-a-vis a country (China) and a continent (Africa). The book examines three particular case studies of dialogues between the EU, China, and Africa, and thereby offers new empirical evidence on the emerging EU-China-Africa trilateral relations. In particular, the case studies explore three different forms of interaction between the EU, China, and Africa, namely bilateralism, multilateralism, and trilateralism.

The first case study examines the bilateral EU-China dialogue on Africa. The second case study looks at the multilateral interaction between the EU, China, and Africa in the framework of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). More specifically, it focuses on the China-DAC Study Group. Finally, the last case study explores the EU’s attempt in 2008 to forge a specific trilateral dialogue with China and the African Union (AU) (European Commission 2008).

The three case studies draw on a rich body of evidence collected through fieldwork in China and Africa, and more than 100 interviews conducted with experts and policymakers from different European institutions, the Chinese government, the AU, and several African countries. The findings thereby make a contribution to the development of a new research branch on trilateral EU-China-Africa relation.

Overall, the findings demonstrate that the EU adopted a constructive response towards China’s role in Africa and started engaging with both strategic
partners in a variety of different policy dialogues. Yet, despite the EU’s outreach to its Chinese and African partners, the research reveals that the overall extent of trilateral EU-China-Africa relations still remains limited and did not reach the level of a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. The analysis suggests that the lack of EU-China-Africa Comprehensive Strategic Partnership can be explained by the fact that the EU chose an inadequate foreign policy instrument. In its interaction with China and Africa, European policymakers opted for a form of engagement steered towards the unilateral adaptation of its partners. Instead, the research findings reveal that in the context of an emerging multipolar world order, the EU needs to engage with its Chinese and African counterparts in terms of a mutual exchange. This would require the EU to revise some of its policies and practices, taking into account the Chinese and African demands.

**INDIA-AFGHANISTAN REVIEW DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION**

India and Afghanistan reviewed the development projects in the war-torn country being implemented with Indian cooperation, including security of Indian personnel, during a meeting of the Joint Working Group on Development Cooperation (JWG-DC) in Kabul. Both sides had an exhaustive review of the large number of ongoing development projects spread over varied areas of cooperation such as capacity building, infrastructure, education, healthcare, good-governance and human resource development. India is a leading development partner of Afghanistan having successfully implemented a large number of infrastructure projects, including the Afghan Parliament building, Afghan-India Friendship Dam, the first phase of the Chabahar port in Iran among others. The Chabahar port on the southeastern coast of Iran is being jointly developed by India, Iran and Afghanistan and is aimed at giving access to Afghanistan bypassing Pakistan. Both sides underscored the importance of access through Chabahar port for strengthening trade and economic relations. The Afghan side appreciated India’s timely assistance of 170,000 tonne of wheat and 2,000 tonne of pulses during this year when large parts of the country were suffering from drought. Several small, medium and largescale projects have been picked up including the Shahtoot dam, low cost housing for the returning refugees in Nangarhar province of Afghanistan, a polyclinic in Mazar-e-Sharif, and construction of a road connecting Band-e-Amir in Bamyan province with the Bamyan-Yakawlang Highway. The Shahtoot dam is a proposed dam in the Kabul river basin that is expected to supply irrigation water for about 10,000 hectares of agricultural land and drinking water to around two million people.

India accepted the request for consideration of new projects, shared by the Afghan side, based on the priorities of the people and the government of Afghanistan.

Triangular cooperation has been emerging as an important modality in development cooperation. The forthcoming United Nations General Assembly meeting on South-South Cooperation being organized in Buenos Aires, 2019, BAPA+40 will involve considerable deliberation on the issues of triangular cooperation. A workshop was held on April 12, 2018 at Buenos Aires to look into the Prospects for Triangular Cooperation in the G20. We produce below the workshop report as received from the organizers.

**SUMMARY**

On April 12 2018, the Workshop on “Perspectives for Triangular Cooperation in the G20” gathered more than 100 representatives of Member States, International Organizations, Think-Tanks and Civil Society Organizations in Buenos Aires. The event was convened by the Argentine G20 Presidency and jointly organized by the General Directorate of International Cooperation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship, and the General Directorate of Cooperation and International Finance of the Ministry of Social Development.

The Workshop was held as a side event of the first meeting of the G20 Development Working Group (DWG), and brought together some of the most important global actors in the field, demonstrating that Triangular Cooperation is an area of common interest with potential to become an entry point for increasing collaboration among G20 members, International Organizations and partner countries.

The Workshop not only located the dialogue around this modality of cooperation in the G20, but also put forward the substantive role that this global forum can play by linking demands of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, with the capacities and experiences in Triangular Cooperation within the Group. Specific attention was paid to the priority areas addressed by the DWG in the framework of the G20 Action Plan on the 2030 Agenda. Participants agreed on the importance of promoting a G20 dialogue on Triangular Cooperation and further leveraging the DWG to advance this discussion, and explore ways to develop or scale-up joint initiatives.
KEY MESSAGES

Triangular Cooperation

• Contributes as a promising instrument to the evolving international cooperation landscape, featuring adequate flexibility to accommodate the growing diversity of actors, resources and instruments.
• Mobilizes and integrates resources and capacities from different development partners.
• Offers a framework to address some of the most pressing global challenges, such as food security, education and human resources development, decent work, sustainable habitat and public health, among many others.
• Has great potential in terms of knowledge sharing and contributing to a consensual approach in tackling development challenges.
• Fosters inclusive global governance by promoting integration between political dialogue and capacity-building.
• Can help localize the Sustainable Development Goals by making use of complementary strengths of multiple stakeholders, including civil society, academic institutions, local authorities, women and youth, as well as private sector.
• Can bring an added value to bilateral cooperation by mobilizing additional resources, bundling experiences and combining affordable and context-based development solutions from Southern partners with the strengths of traditional ones, including management capacity and country presence.
• Requires deepening the ongoing processes of mapping, guidelines implementation and impact assessment, with a view to scaling up initiatives, enhance effectiveness and ensure sustainability.
• Offers opportunities for the G20’s DWG to fulfill its mandate, notably in contributing to the implementation of the G20 Action Plan on the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.
• Benefits from the G20 role as a unique platform for mutual learning, partnership building, mainstreaming and coordination among development partners, and from gathered experiences to take forward the debate on the future of international cooperation.
SUMMARY OF DISCUSSION

Defining Triangular Cooperation

Triangular Cooperation (TC) is a modality that favours horizontal schemes between partners at various stages of development, in areas of common interest. It involves a wide diversity of actors and institutional frameworks, providing for a practitioners perspective both in terms of policy formulation and practices on the ground.

It combines the vision of North-South Cooperation and South-South Cooperation, and builds on Southern partners’ experience and knowledge and of what can deliver more effectively in their development context. TC also favours integration between political dialogue and capacity building, which is necessary to reach concrete and sustainable results. It goes beyond “one size fits all” solutions, and helps bringing all parties together to take an active participation in the decision making process.

At the same time, TC, as collective action mechanism, can have a catalytic effect on development and in the provision of global public goods, since it already addresses some of the most pressing global challenges, such as food security, education and human resources development, decent work, sustainable habitat and public health, among many others. Finally, TC meets the conditions to become a unique platform for understanding the transformations that international cooperation requires in the new global context.

Fostering common criteria in Triangular Cooperation

Participants placed emphasis in the guiding principles outlined below:

*Flexibility:* TC can take different implementation arrangements (South-North-South; South-South-South, South-International Organization-South). This leaves a window open to multiple possibilities: a partnership among several developing countries or between two developing countries and a developed one, or among several developing countries and regional or multilateral organizations, including civil society and private sector organizations.

*Demand driven:* TC is established in a voluntarily way through the explicit request of the recipient partner.

*Alignment with national development strategies:* Triangular partnerships work as a nexus where partners share common goals within their respective cooperation strategy, developed hand in hand with the host government. This reinforces countries autonomy to analyze its own development challenges and to pursue context-based solutions to expand local capacities.

*Horizontality and shared governance:* TC relationships that are not vertical and are established voluntarily without conditions or impositions of any kind. In this modality,
partners jointly participate in all the stages of the cooperation cycle and decisions are made by consensus. This can be formalized through memorandums of understanding, strategic frameworks or elaboration of guidelines and operational manuals.

**Sustainability:** TC’s involvement of Southern partners with longstanding bilateral cooperation bonds and also of International Organizations with capillary presence on the ground allows for partnerships to continue beyond the duration of the activity. These strengths can serve as a key plank in leaving installed capacities in the recipient partner and in carrying out a systematic and long term follow-up.

**Multi-stakeholder approach:** Inclusive partnerships play an increasing role in TC. Participation of civil society, academic institutions, local authorities, women and youth, as well as private sector is essential to increase ownership, sustainability and impact of development cooperation actions.

**Trust-building:** Transparency and accountability are key to maintain trust within a triangular partnership. Both processes and management structure must be accountable.

**Multiplier effect:** TC encourages synergies and avoids duplication. It allows for peer-learning among all stakeholders, while partnerships with IO’s favour a global perspective.

**Challenges and opportunities for Triangular Cooperation in the G20 DWG**

Participants emphasized that the G20 can both enable and benefit from Triangular Cooperation. As a global forum that conveys developed and developing countries, it has the potential to become an inclusive platform for sharing experiences and knowledge through this modality of cooperation. At the same time, TC offers opportunities for the G20’s DWG to fulfill its mandate, notably in the contributing to the implementation of the G20 Action Plan on the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. The following are some of the areas for further work that were singled out in the Workshop:

- Expand contact networks and establish consultation mechanisms to determine possible matching of sustainable development demands and existing capacities.
- Exploit synergies among South-South and Triangular Cooperation database platforms (Ibero-American Program to Strengthen South-South Cooperation, SSMart for Sustainable Development Goals, Global Partnership Initiative on Effective Triangular Cooperation, African Peer Review Mechanism and New Partnership for Africa’s Development, among others)
- Push forward trilateral schemes that reach out to non-G20 members.
- Promote G20 DWG as a brokerage agent to foster peer-to-peer learning on Triangular Cooperation that draws on Members experience.
India’s development partnership with Sri Lanka has been an important facet of the close friendship between the two nations. This partnership has evolved over time as per the requirements of the people of Sri Lanka and the priorities set by their government.

While our development partnership has been strong through the decades, it significantly expanded in scope and breadth after the 2004 Tsunami and the end of the conflict in Sri Lanka in 2009. Since 2005, Government of India has committed around USD 2.9 billion to Sri Lanka, out of which USD 0.545 billion is outright grant assistance, and USD 2.35 billion is under concessional credit.

In the immediate aftermath of the conflict, the focus of Indian assistance was on emergency relief assistance for the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). Subsequently, the priority shifted to facilitate movement of the people and their early resettlement, such as deployment of demining teams, providing temporary shelters and assisting in livelihood restoration. Once the emergency and short-term needs were catered for, attention shifted to the long-term needs for housing, reconstruction and development. Infrastructure projects across Sri Lanka were also undertaken. The portfolio of projects is vast, and now encompasses virtually all areas, including housing, education, health, livelihood, vocational training, women empowerment, transport and culture, to list a few. Capacity building has been an integral part of these projects.

To cater to the wide variety of projects and beneficiaries, India’s development projects are implemented under three broad rubrics. Large-scale infrastructure projects are implemented using highly concessional Lines of Credit (LoC) and Buyer’s Credit schemes, with significant long-term impact over large parts of the population.

India has nearly completed 46,000 houses in Northern and Eastern Provinces of Sri Lanka, and construction of another 14,000 houses in the plantation sector for estate workers is currently underway. Separately, another 1,200 houses are being constructed across Sri Lanka, particularly in the Southern Province, in partnership with Sri Lankan government agencies, under their Model Village Programme and Gram-Shakti housing Programme.

*High Commissioner of India to Sri Lanka.
The development of the railway sector, particularly the restoration of connectivity between northern and southern Sri Lanka, is a good example of this. Our USD 1.3 billion commitment has also covered restoration of railway lines in southern Sri Lanka, which were destroyed after the 2004 Tsunami, as well as supply of rolling stock and capacity building of Sri Lankan railway personnel. Similarly, a project to rehabilitate and upgrade Kankensanthurai harbor is underway, which will permit its full utilization as a commercial port and facilitate movement of cargo between southern India and northern Sri Lanka. A fresh USD 100 million LoC has just been announced for solar projects under the International Solar Alliance (ISA) framework. Indian companies are also engaged in projects in the water sector, with nearly US$ 0.6 billion through Buyer’s Credit.

Large grant assistance projects come under the second rubric, which also have large-scale impact. Its flagship project is the Indian Housing Project (IHP). With a grant outlay of around USD 345 million, IHP is an innovative beneficiary-driven model that is being replicated elsewhere, thanks to its tremendous success. Under this, India has nearly completed 46000 houses in Northern and Eastern Provinces of Sri Lanka, and construction of another 14000 houses (including 10000 houses announced by Hon’ble Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi in May 2017 in Sri Lanka) in the plantation sector for estate workers is currently underway. Separately, another 1200 houses are being constructed across Sri Lanka, particularly in the Southern Province, in partnership with Sri Lankan government agencies, under their Model Village Programme and Gram-Shakti housing Programme.

Another innovative large grant project, which has contributed to saving thousands of lives, is the free Emergency Ambulance Service. It was initially launched in the Western and Southern Provinces with a grant of USD 7.56 million. It is now being expanded nationwide with an additional grant of USD 15.02 million, following an announcement by Prime Minister Modi in May 2017. Other important projects include a new 150-bed hospital complex at Hatton-Dickoya at a cost of around USD 7.6 million and a state-of-the-art cultural center in Jaffna at a cost of around USD 12 million. India has also undertaken the restoration of the historic Thiruketeeswaram temple in Mannar.

Small Development Projects (SDP), amounting to a maximum of around USD 2 million per project, comprise the third rubric. The objective of this modality is to simplify procedures and expedite approvals, and is underpinned by an overarching MoU between the two countries. These projects also help generate local jobs and enhance capacity. More than 70 SDPs across have been under taken since 2005, with around 20 such projects currently under implementation.

The scope of these SDPs is truly diverse, and has included renovation of schools, provision of computers, establishment of English Language Labs and e-learning centers, provision of medical equipment to hospitals, construction of child development centres, establishment of Vocational Training Centres, renovation of Duraiyappa stadium in Jaffna, establishment of handicrafts village in Hambantota, setting up of industrial estate in Atchchuveli, provision of fishing boats and other fishing implements to fishermen, setting up faculties of Engineering and
Agriculture in the Kilinochchi campus of Jaffna University, construction of 3000 rain water harvesting tanks in Jaffna, setting up a Kandyan Dance Training School under the Sacred Tooth Temple, establishment of a Trilingual National School in Polonnaruwa, and construction of a 1500 seat capacity auditorium in Ruhunu University in Matara, among others. A project to provide livelihood assistance by gifting sewing machines, bicycles with retrofitted stands to carry fish, and other agricultural implements to as many as 70,000 beneficiaries in Hambantota, was launched recently in April 2018. As an innovative variant, the Self-Employed Women’s Association (SEWA), Gujarat, partnered with us in a project to impart vocational training for widows and women headed families in the Eastern Province. This will now be replicated in the Northern Province.

In addition to projects, India also offers capacity building assistance through short-term and long-term scholarship programmes. Around 700 scholarships are provided annually to Sri Lankan students, for studies at various levels in India and Sri Lanka. In addition, around 400 short-term training slots are offered to Sri Lanka under Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) programme.

Apart from planned development partnership activities, India has also been the first responder with immediate relief and rescue assistance during natural calamities in Sri Lanka, be it the 2004 Tsunami or the 2017 floods.

Development partnership projects implemented by Government of India in Sri Lanka have been widely appreciated for the value they generate per unit of assistance provided, transparent and collaborative approach, timely implementation through recourse to local materials and manpower, and in a manner that supports local economies. India remains committed to partner with and assist in Sri Lanka’s development efforts in all possible ways.

MARKING 60 YEARS OF SUCCESSFUL INDO-GERMAN DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION

India and Germany have recently signed agreements on financial and technical cooperation worth Rs 5,250 crore within the framework of the Indo-German development cooperation. The agreements mark 60 years of successful Indo-German development cooperation and the committed funds serve to continue successful development policy programmes. The focus is on sustainable urban development. As part of the cooperation, areas such as infrastructure development, urban mobility and climate resilience that go along the Indian government’s ‘smart cities’ initiative. In December 2017, Germany pledged €1,055 million (around Rs 8,500 crore) for development cooperation with India during the Indo-German inter-governmental negotiations in Delhi. Environmental and resource protection is also one of the funded areas of the cooperation. Vocational training and social protection and the promotion of Indian women entrepreneurs are other areas of focus.

Source: https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/economy/india-germany-sign-pacts-worth-rs-5250-cr/article24570765.ece
The world trade has undergone tectonic shifts in the recent decade; much of that can be explained by the dynamism of the trade of the Southern economies. While the share of the North in global trade has declined, the share of the South marked a steady rise. In addition to the increasing trade volumes, the South is more integrated now with the global economy. In relative terms, the Southern trade has grown faster than output. During the global buoyancy (2003-07), output of the South grew by 6.9 per cent whereas Southern trade registered a growth rate of 16.9 per cent. Interestingly, the rising trend in Southern trade prevailed even during the first episode of the global recession (2007-09). With deeper trade liberalisation, the South has emerged as the engine of world trade.

Introduction of a Section on Peer Reviewed Articles/Essays

In keeping with suggestions, feedbacks and accumulated experience, we have decided to introduce a section, containing peer reviewed full length articles/essays. Interested scholars willing to contribute are requested to send in their manuscripts (preferably in not more than 5000 words) to the editorial office.

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We invite contributions from interested readers on issues related to development cooperation in general and South-South Cooperation in particular. Contributions may also capture theory, practice and associated debates on development cooperation. Reviews of latest publications - books, monographs, reports - are also welcome. Any institutional upcoming events on development cooperation may also be captured in DCR. The contributions should be restricted to not more than 1500 words.

For editorial information, contributions, feedback and comments: mail to milindo.chakrabarti@ris.org.in and dgoffice@ris.org.in

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3. Use ‘s’ in ‘-ise’ ‘-isation’ words; e.g., ‘civilise’, ‘organisation’. Use British spellings rather than American spellings. Thus, ‘labour’ not ‘labor’. (2 per cent, 3 km, 36 years old, etc.). In general descriptions, numbers below 10 should be spelt out in words. Use thousands, millions, billions, not lakh and crore. Use fuller forms for numbers and dates — for example 1980-88, pp. 200-202 and pp. 178-84. for example ‘the eighties’, ‘the twentieth century’, etc.

Reference Style: References should be appended at the end of the paper. References must in double space, and should be same author(s) is cited, then arrange them chronologically by year of publication.

All references should be embedded in the text in the APA style. For details please refer to Course and Subject Guides: https://pitt.libguides.com/c.php?g=12108&p=64730

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About Development Cooperation Review

Development Cooperation Review (DCR) aspires to capture holistic narrative around global development cooperation and fill an important knowledge gap towards theorisation, empirical verification and documentation of Southern-led development cooperation processes. Despite growing volumes of development partnerships around the Southern world, there remains an absence of detailed information, analysis and its contribution to global development processes. Even though there have been sporadic efforts in documenting some of the activities, a continuous effort in chronicling the diverse experiences in South-South Cooperation (SSC) is still absent. RIS, in joint publication with FIDC and NeST has endeavoured to launch DCR, a monthly periodical, to fill this gap till March 2019 after which DCR would graduate to become a full-fledged Journal.

DCR is designed to bring policy-makers, officials, researchers, academics and the development practitioners onto a global platform to share their ideas, experiences and concerns vis-a-vis development cooperation. The periodical would further allow us to feature special write-ups, analyses, opinion pieces, commentaries and in general the South’s take on the emerging narratives of global architecture of development cooperation, including ODA.

About Research and Information System for Developing Countries (RIS)

RIS is a New Delhi–based autonomous policy research institute envisioned as a forum for fostering effective policy dialogue and capacity-building among developing countries on global and regional economic issues. The focus of the work programme of RIS is to promote South-South Cooperation and collaborate with developing countries in multilateral negotiations in various forums.  

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About Network of Southern Think Tanks (NeST)

NeST was established on the sidelines of the first high-level meeting (HLM) of the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC) in Mexico in April 2014, and as a follow-up to the Conference of Southern Providers held in Delhi in April 2013. The network has committed itself to ‘generating, systematising, consolidating and sharing knowledge on South–South co-operation (SSC) approaches to international development’.  

@NeST_SSC

About Forum for Indian Development Cooperation (FIDC)

FIDC aims to encourage detailed analysis of broad trends in South-South cooperation and contextualise Indian policies by facilitating discussions across various subject streams and stakeholders based on theoretical and empirical analysis, field work, perception surveys and capacity building needs.  

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Perspectives
Lexicon and Syntax of Development Cooperation: Do we need to evaluate SSC and frame a template for its reporting?
Milindo Chakrabarti

Book Review
EU-China-Africa Trilateral Relations in a Multipolar World: Hic Sunt Dracones
Pratyush Sharma

Document
Workshop on ‘Prospects for Triangular Cooperation in the G20’

Ambassador Perspective
India’s Development Cooperation in Sri Lanka
Taranjit Singh Sandhu

SSC in Statistics